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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Civil Commitment of Mentally IIll
Right to Treatment
Parens PatriaePower - Right to Liberty
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975)

T

Kenneth Donaldson, was involuntarily civilly committed!
as a mental patient' in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee. He
remained confined for almost 15 years.' During that time he received little or
no psychiatric care or treatment. His confinement was a "simple regime of
enforced custodial care, not a program designed to alleviate or cure his
supposed illness."' Donaldson, who was not aggressive or belligerent,5
repeatedly attempted to secure his release,6 claiming that the defendants
unjustifiably continued to confine him despite attempts by responsible parties
to have him released to their custody.7 In February, 1971, Donaldson filed suit
under the Civil Rights Act of 18718 against five hospital and state mental
HE RESPONDENT,

I O'Connor

v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2489 n.2 (1975). The judicial proceedings were
initiated by Donaldson's father pursuant to the Florida Mental Health Act, FLA. STAT. § 394.22
(11)
(1955) (repealed 1971). Donaldson was adjudged "incompetent" several days earlier
under The Florida Mental Health Act, FLA. STAT. § 394.22(1) (1955) (repealed 1971).
2 95 S. Ct. at 2488. Donaldson was found to be suffering from "paranoid schizophrenia."
Id. Prior to 1970 Donaldson had presented his claim for release unsuccessfully at least 12
times in state and federal courts. See generally Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEo.
LJ. 752,775 (1969). The United States Supreme Court had denied Donaldson habeas corpus
relief four times. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); Donaldson v. O'Connor,
390 U.S. 971 (1968); Donaldson v. Florida, 371 U.S. 806 (1962); In re Donaldson, 364 U.S.
808 (1960). The hospital staff had the authority to initiate the release of Donaldson, but,
despite many requests, refused to do so.
3'

495 S.Ct. at 2490. Donaldson, a Christian Scientist, refused to take any medication or submit

to electroshock treatments. In Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 511, 513-14 (5th Cir.
1974), the court provides the following information: (1) psychiatric counseling, ground
privileges, and occupational therapy were consistently withheld from Donaldson; (2) Donaldson
was confined to a locked room containing 60 beds; (3) one-third of the occupants in
Donaldson's wing were classified as criminals.
595 S.Ct. at 2490. The evidence further showed that Donaldson had never committed a violent
act, was not suicidal, and could have earned a living on his own had he been released.
Donaldson had been working prior to his commitment, and secured responsible employment
immediately upon his release. See also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d at 517.
8 See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
T 95 S.Ct. at 2490. See 493 F.2d at 515-17, for a detailed description of the efforts by various
responsible parties to have Donaldson released.
8

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
in an action at1976
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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health officials, contending' that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed him
a right to be treated or released.
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida,1" holding that a
"person involuntarily civilly committed to a state mental hospital has
a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a
reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition. '" 1
The United States Supreme Court granted O'Connor's petition for
certiorari."2 While finding for the respondent, the Court unanimously vacated
the decision of the appellate court, concluding that the analysis of the court of
appeals was too "broad" and that many of the difficult issues of constitutional
law to which that court addressed itself were "not presented by this case in its
present posture."'" The Supreme Court held that a "state cannot constitutionally confine without more a non-dangerous individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends.""
The concept that a mental patient has a constitutional right to treatment is
of recent origin, being generally credited to Dr. Martin Birnbaum, who was the
first to espouse such a right in a celebrated article published in 1960.1' Prior to
the article's publication, the courts were primarily concerned with ensuring
that the mentally ill in need of confinement were placed in non-penal institutions. " However, the idea of a constitutional right to treatment in the wake of
Dr. Birnbaum's article has received a significant amount of support among the
9

Donaldson's original complaint was filed as a class action seeking habeas corpus relief and

damages. He also sought injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the hospital to provide
adequate psychiatric treatment. The district court dismissed the class action and Donaldson
amended his complaint to include individual compensatory and punitive damages. The prayer
for declaratory and injunctive relief was eliminated prior to trial. 95 S. Ct. at 2488 n.l.
10 95 S. Ct. at 2492. A judgment of $28,500 in compensatory and $10,000 in punitive damages
was awarded by the jury.
11493 F.2d at 520.
12 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 419 U.S. 894 (1974).

1:195 S. Ct. at 2492.
14 Id. at 2494.
15 See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 502-03 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Birnbaum]. Dr. Birnbaum has been referred to as the "father" of the right to treatment doctrine.
See also Editorial, A New Right, 46 A.B.A.J. 516 (1960).
16 See, e.g., Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass.
313, 159 N.E.2d 82 (1958); In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1959). See
generally Birnbaum, supra note 15, at 502. See also Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MicH. L. REv. 945 (1959).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss2/9
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8

In Rouse v. Cameron, 9 a landmark case,2 ° the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that a patient, who was committed to a federal mental
hospital as a result of an acquittal by reason of insanity, had a statutory right
to treatment.21 This right, the court explained, could be satisfied by bona fide
efforts of the hospital staff to provide adequate treatment 2 consistent with the
present state of medical knowledge. 2 While this right to treatment was not constitutionally based, the court in dicta alluded to possible due process and eighth
amendment questions raised by an absence of treatment after commitment. 4
Two years later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Nason
v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital," acknowledged a constitutionally grounded right to treatment. Nason declared that the confinement of
the mentally ill, who were not convicted of criminal acts, without treatment,
would constitute a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.26
Rouse and Nason dealt with patients who were committed to mental
institutions following criminal proceedings, and, therefore, did not directly
address the issue of whether involuntarily civilly committed patients have
a constitutional right to treatment. Recently, however, several district courts
have considered this issue. 2"
17 See, e.g., Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 742 (1969);
Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 755 (1969);
Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134 (1967); Symposium, The Right to
Treatment, 57 GEO. LJ. 673 (1969).
24 See notes 19-37 and accompanying text infra.

19 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Rouse sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he
was not receiving treatment during the three years of his confinement in the mental hospital.
Had he been found guilty of the criminal charges he would have faced a maximum prison
sentence of one year.
20 The
Rouse decision has been followed and approved in subsequent decisions. See, e.g.,
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States ex. rel. Schuster v. Herold,
410 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1969); Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
21 Mentally Ill Act of 1964, D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (Supp. V. 1966), providing for
treatment of a person in a public hospital.
22 Most courts define treatment in terms of a realistic opportunity or good faith effort to cure
or improve the patient's condition. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 374 (M.D. Ala. 1972), af'd sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
23 373 F.2d at 456.

Id. at 453.
25 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968) (semble).
28 Id. at 612, 233 N.E.2d at 913.
27 Holding that there is a right to treatment: Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn.
1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.
Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), on submission of proposed standards by defendants 334 F. Supp.
1341,by enforced
344 F. Supp.1976
373 (1972), afl'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 3
Published
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Wyatt v. Stickney ' was the first district court case to employ section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,2" rather than a habeas corpus petition,"0
to uphold a right to treatment for civilly committed mental patients. The
court in Wyatt reasoned that since the purpose of involuntary confinement in
mental institutions is not penal in nature, but rather rehabilitative, the only
constitutional justification for civil commitment is treatment which will extend
to each patient a realistic opportunity to cure or improve his condition.
Otherwise, the hospital does not serve its function and is relegated to the
status of a prison, 1 thereby denying the patient due process of the law. 2
The court of appeals" in Donaldson found a constitutional right to
treatment based upon the proposition that civil commitment entails a massive
curtailment of liberty." The fourteenth amendment guarantees that an
individual's liberty shall not be denied or significantly restrained, without due
process of law. Due process requires a state to prove a legitimate governmental
interest in order to commit an individual to a mental institution. 5
The court of appeals recognized three grounds for civil commitment that
may qualify as legitimate governmental interests to justify a non-trivial
abridgement of a person's freedom: 3" danger to others, danger to self, and the
(5th Cir. 1974). Holding that there is no right to treatment: New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Burnham v. Department
of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
28 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), on submission of proposed standards by defendants 334
F. Supp. 1341, enforced 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afl'd sub nom. Wyatt v.

Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
29 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See also Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Welsch
v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); Burckett v. Power, 355 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Ariz. 1973). But cf. Burnham v. Depart-

ment of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
30
See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364
F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973).

31325
32

F. Supp. at 785.

Several courts have suggested that in addition to a due process argument there are eighth

amendment arguments applicable to cases of civil commitment without treatment. See, e.g.,
Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686
(N.D. I11. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd sub. nom. Wyatt

v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); United States v. Pardue, 354 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Conn. 1973). Cf. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
33 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (1974).
34 Id. at 520, citing, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405

U.S. 504 (1972). "Civil Commitment, because it is for an indefinite term, may involve a more
serious abridgement of personal freedom than imprisonment for commission of a crime usually
does." 493 F.2d at 520.
35
See note 43 and accompanying text infra.
36 493 F.2d at 520. See Tribe, Foreword-Towarda Model of Rules in Due Process of Life and

Law, 87 HARv. L.

REV.

1, 17 (1973). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172-73 (1973),
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need for treatment."7 These grounds fall within two general categories; one
being the "police power" of the state to protect society from danger, and the
other being the parenspatriae' power of the state to assume the guardianship
of all persons who are incompetent to care for themselves.
On the foundation of the above principles the court of appeals proceeded
to formulate two rationales for the "right to treatment" theory. The first is a
substantive due process theory based upon parens patriae grounds, while the
second is the quid pro quo theory, which is framed in a procedural context.
Under the parenspatriaedoctrine, if an individual is unable to adequately
care for himself the state has the power to assume his guardianship. 9 The
court interpreted this power of guardianship as requiring the state to properly
exercise its responsibility to extend treatment to a non-dangerous civilly
committed patient. " The court of appeals relied upon the case of Jackson v.
Indiana" to support its position. In Jackson, the United States Supreme Court
required that the duration and nature of the confinement bear some reasonable
relation to the purposes for which the individual was committed.42 Therefore,
the court reasoned, when the sole basis for civil commitment of a mentally ill
person is his need for treatment, as was the case with Donaldson, then due
process to be satisfied requires that adequate treatment in fact be provided. " '
Secondly, the court of appeals formulated a quid pro quo theory of a due
process right to treatment which embraced both parens patriae and police
power rationales for civil commitment." Unlike the parens patriae rationale
noted in Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82

YALE

L.J. 920,

935 (1973).
493 F.2d at 520, citing Jackson v. Indiana 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972).
493 F.2d at 521. See Comment, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 87 HARV.L. REV. 1190, 1209 nn. 55 & 56 (1974), which is an excellent and comprehensive
analysis of the state of the law in the area of civil commitments.
9
3 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1971); Johnson v. State, 18 NJ. 422, 114
A.2d 1, 5 (1955).
40493 F.2d at 520-21. See also Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. IMI. 1973);
Horacek v. 357 F. Supp. 71 (D. Neb. 1973).
41 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
42 Id. at 738. See Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134, 1141 (1967).
37

38

'ro deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is
for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very
fundamentals of due process." 493 F.2d at 521, quoting Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781,
785 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
44 493 F.2d at 521-25. Since Donaldson's commitment was not based upon any police power
rationale, the court's quid pro quo analysis is largely dictum. Presumably the court wanted to
formulate a theory which would serve as a guideline for future courts deciding upon the
confinement of mental patients regardless of the initial grounds.
43
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which is limited in application to non-dangerous persons, the quid pro quo
theory includes both dangerous and non-dangerous patients. 5
6
Since there is a lack of procedural safeguards in civil commitments," a
patient's continuing confinement must be justified by receiving something in
return. The court stated that there are "central limitations" upon the detention
power of the state-that detention be in retribution for a specific offense, the
term of confinement be fixed, and that it be permitted only after a hearing
where fundamental procedural safeguards are observed. 7 Where these
limitations are absent, the abridgement of procedural rights could only be
justified by the existence of a quid pro quo extended to the individual by the
government to justify confinement. The court further stated that the quid pro
quo traditionally recognized to be sufficient in the case of confinement for
mental illness was rehabilitative or adequate and effective treatment beyond
the level of custodial care provided by penal institutions.48

The United States Supreme Court, in vacating the opinion of the court of
appeals, rejected the view that a person confined against his will in a mental
institution has a constitutional right to treatment regardless of the original
grounds for commitment." Viewing the issue narrowly, the Court held that
Donaldson's right to liberty was being denied by the state because the
evidence showed that none of the accepted grounds for continued confinement
remained present in his case.5"
Assuming arguendo, that respondent Donaldson's original commitment
was proper, the Court stated that it could not constitutionally be allowed
to continue after that basis no longer existed.5" The Court rejected
arguments that the state may indefinitely confine the mentally ill against
their will solely due to their illness when they are capable of safely existing
outside a mental health facility."
The Supreme Court in limiting its holding to the particular facts of
the Donaldson case,53 rejected the court of appeals' analysis that when
45 See 493 F.2d at 521-25.
46 See text accompanying note 47 infra.
4T Id. at 522.
48 Id. at 522-25.

49 95 S. Ct. 2492.
50 Id. at 2493. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
51 See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 738 (1972); cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370

U.S. 660 (1962).
52

95 S. Ct. at 2493, citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971); Shelton v. Tucker,

364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960).
53 See 95 S. Ct. at 2492 where the court stated:

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss2/9

6

Cooper: Donaldson v. O'Connor

AKRON LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 9:2

non-dangerous persons are involuntarily civilly committed as mental patients
the state has no power to continue to confine them unless they are provided
with treatment."4 Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurring opinion that
only recently did the concept arise that a state may not confine the mentally ill
except as to provide them with treatment,5" and that traditionally, the states
were concerned with providing a more humane place of confinement as well
as providing treatment, recognizing that for many types of mental illness, no
effective therapy is available.56 Specifically, Chief Justice Burger found that
due process limitations do not limit the parens patriae power of the states to
confine a non-dangerous mentally ill person only when treatment is provided."
Chief Justice Burger also stated that as a rationale for a constitutional
right to treatment the quid pro quo theory has serious deficiencies, in that due
process was never intended to be an inflexible concept. 8 The requirements
of due process are "determined in particular instances by identifying and
accommodating the interests of the individual and society."5 9 Chief Justice
Burger criticized the quid pro quo theory on the basis that it presupposes an
incorrect postulate, that the same interests are present in every situation
where a state seeks to confine an individual."0 Furthermore, he denounced the
theory on the basis that it elevates procedural safeguards into substantive
rights by accepting the absence of such safeguards and insisting that in
Specifically, there is no reason now to decide whether mentally ill persons dangerous to

themselves or to others have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the
state, or whether the state may compulsorily confine a non dangerous, mentally ill

individual for the purpose of treatment. As we view it, this case raises a single, relatively
simple, but nonetheless important question concerning every man's constitutional right
to liberty.

See also note 13 and accompanying text supra.
54 95 S. Ct. at 2497 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
55
See Editorial, A New Right, 46 A.B.A.J. 516 (1960); Comment, Development in the LawCivil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190 (1974).
56 95 S. Ct. at 2497-98 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See A. DEuTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN
AMERICA, 38-54, 114-31, 228-71 (2d ed. 1949); Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Treatment,
62 CALIF. L. REV. 936, 941-48 (1974).

5T95 S.Ct. at 2497-98. Chief Justice Burger takes cognizance of the uncertainty of diagnosis and
treatment in the field of mental illness. He also notes the common phenomenon of patients
refusing to acknowledge their illness-a universally recognized first step to effective treatment.

Chief Justice Burger further notes that many mental patients who are incapable of being treated
are also incapable of existing independently in society, and, thus, the state may legitimately
provide custodial confinement. See generally Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375
(1956); Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanted Legal Fiction? 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 755,

768-69 (1969).
58 95 S. Ct. at 2499.

5 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-84 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent
Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1972); McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-55
(1971).
60 95 S.Ct. at 2499 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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exchange, treatment be provided as compensation.6 1
In limiting the holding in the instant case to its facts, the Supreme Court
appears reluctant to step into a quagmire of mental illness issues which it
considers to be largely within the province of the legislature. Chief Justice
Burger quoted the principle declared in In re Gault,12 that the "courts may not
substitute for the judgment of legislators their own understanding of the public
welfare, but must instead concern themselves with the validity of methods
which the legislature has selected." A major consideration for denying a
constitutional right to treatment for all civilly committed mental patients is the
great uncertainty of medical knowledge in the field of mental illness,
particularly with reference to the formulation of objective standards with
which to gauge the adequacy of treatment.63 Presumably, the Court does not
relish the prospect of deciding a multitude of cases in which mental patients
would claim that they were being denied adequate treatment.
CONCLUSION

While the Court does not consider judicial review of the adequacy of
treatment to be a nonjusticiable question,6" it also does not desire to "abandon
the traditional limitations on the scope of judicial review." 65 The Court appears
content to decide whether civilly committed patients have been denied due
process on a case-by-case basis using the test enunciated in Jackson.66 The
Court there required that the nature and duration of the commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purposes for which the individual was
committed. Thus, if any significant improvement in the qualitative and
quantitative levels of treatment in mental facilities is to occur, the impetus will
largely have to arise from the legislature as the Supreme Court is reluctant to
create or expand constitutional rights of individuals in this area of the law. In
effect, the Court has left the door open to entertain suits of this nature, but has
declined to issue an invitation to do so. The brevity and general lack of
supporting rationale in the Court's opinion is vivid testimony to its reluctance
in alleviating the plight of civilly committed mental patients in the shadow of
legislative procrastination and indifference. However, this deference to the
concept of separation of powers appears in part to be motivated by a desire
not to review the adequacy of legislative appropriations and the measures
61

See In re Gault, 387, U.S. 1, 71 (1967)

(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting in part). See

also Comment, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 1190, 1325 n. 39 (1974).

387 U.S. 1,71 (1967).
95 S. Ct. at 2499 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See cases cited note 58 supra.
64 95 S. Ct. at 2493 n.10.
65 95 S. Ct. at 2500 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
66 406 U.S.715 (1972).
62
63
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which the states have provided for the care of mental patients; a situation which
conceivably could pose as many difficulties in terms of judicial policing as
have resulted from Brown v. Board of Education6" and its progeny.
GARY

G. COOPER

6r7 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

REMEDIES
Awarding Counsel Fees • American Rule - Equitable
Exceptions • PrivateAttorney General
Theory . Limitations
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
95 S. Ct. 1616 (1975)

T

in its decision in Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,' denied the federal courts the power to
assess attorney's fees against a party to a suit, solely upon the court's
appraisement of the social value of a successful plaintiff's suit.
HE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,

The Alyeska case arose out of the litigation to enjoin construction of
the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. The plaintiffs, three environmentalist groups,'
brought action in March, 1970, in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, to enjoin the defendant, the Secretary of the Interior, from
issuing permits to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System,3 which would allow
construction of the pipeline across public lands.' The plaintiffs alleged that
the Department of the Interior had failed to file an adequate "environmental
impact statement" as required under the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969,' and that the Secretary of Interior could not grant any request for
temporary land-use permits adjacent to a permanent right-of-way without
violating the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.8
1 Wilderness Soc'y

v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub. nom. Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975).
2
The three environmental groups involved were the Wilderness Society, the Environmental
Defense Fund, and the Friends of the Earth.
3 A subsidiary of the oil company consortium developing the North Slope, later changed to
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
4 Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
5 42 U.S.C. § 4321 etseq. (1970).
6 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), provides in part that:
Rights of way through the public lands, including the forest reserves of the United States,
may be granted by the Secretary of the Interior for pipeline purposes for the
transportation of oil or natural gas to any applicant possessing the qualifications

provided
in section 181 1976
of this title, to the extent of the ground occupied by the said 9
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